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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we consider the relative efficiency of unit taxation
and ad valorem taxation in terms of welfare implications in differ-
ent imperfectly competitive markets. Under the assumption that
these two taxations can produce the same total output in equilib-
rium, which is also used by Anderson (2001), we show that ad
valorem taxation is always welfare superior to unit taxation under
full nationalisation, full privatisation, and partial privatisation.
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Why were public firms so common in the past, even in western countries, and why
were many of them privatised during the past few decades? Some recent papers argue
that through state ownership the government can avoid the distortions to managerial
incentives created by corporate income tax. Amiram, Bauer, and Frank (2013) exploit
exogenous changes in a country’s shareholder dividend tax policy to examine man-
agerial incentives for corporate tax avoidance. They conclude that corporate tax
avoidance significantly increases (decreases) after an exogenous elimination (enhance-
ment) of an imputation system and closely-held firms in countries where shareholder
benefits exist (do not exist) engage in more (less) corporate tax avoidance.
Koethenbuerger and Stimmelmayr (2014) analyse whether the cost of investment
should be tax exempt using an agency model of firm behaviour. They find that an
efficient tax system may not allow for a full deduction of the cost of investment and
that a switch to an allowance for a corporate equity system can increase investment,
but may reduce welfare. When the corporate tax rate is high enough, state ownership
may be less inefficient than private ownership. If this argument was right, then the
capital intensity of public firms should fall with privatisation (Gordon, 2001).
However, the data showed instead that firms lay off a sizable fraction of their work
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force when they are privatised, suggesting that public firms are unusually
labor intensive.
Early theoretical interest about the interaction between public and private firms
begins in the 1980s (De Fraja and Delbono, 1989). This paper considers n private
firms competing with one public firm producing homogenous goods with the same
technology involving a fixed cost and increasing marginal costs (and no capacity con-
straint). Under Cournot-Nash competition and provided that the market is suffi-
ciently competitive (n exceeds some threshold), they show that welfare is improved if
the public firm maximises profit instead of welfare. This is a strong argument for pri-
vatisation when markets are sufficiently competitive.
The study of taxation in duopolistic settings has drawn much attention recently.
However, there have been very few analyses of taxation in the context of mixed duo-
polies, where private and public firms coexist in the same market and maximise dif-
ferent objective functions.
Also, taxation incidence is concerned with the effect of taxation upon prices and
profits. Since perfectly competitive firms earn zero profits, under perfect competition
there is only a price effect. However, under imperfect competition, there are both
price and profit effects. Since prices are set above marginal cost, an increase in cost
due to a change in taxation need not be reflected in an identical increase in price. In
addition, in most countries, it is common observe 'mixed oligopoliesʼ in which state-
owned public firms compete against private firms. For example, public and private
firms coexist in industries such as public utilities, telecommunication, transportation,
postal service, banking, insurance, housing, education, and health care. In these mixed
markets, public and private firms compete not only in price or quantity, but in the
quality of their services or goods. Although the number of studies on mixed markets
has increased in recent years, quality competition in mixed oligopoly has received lit-
tle interest in the literature. The purpose of this paper is to compare the effects of
indirect taxation in different types of mixed-duopoly markets.
There are some previous theoretical and empirical papers on efficiency com-
parison of unit taxation and ad valorem taxation in mixed duopoly markets, or a
closely related subject. It has been argued by De Fraja (2009) that when private
and public firms interact, differences in objective function between them will lead
to differences in observed dimensions of performance, often in unexpected and
counterintuitive ways. Interaction between private and public entities is hugely
important and it will be clearly a fundamental feature of developing economies for
the foreseeable future.1
The objective maximisation problem of the private firm is different from the pub-
lic firm and partially privatised firm. The private firm maximises profits, while the
privatised firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration as has been
examined by Matsumura (1998). Matsumura shows that neither full privatisation (the
government does not hold any shares) nor full nationalisation (the government holds
all of the shares) is optimal under moderate conditions. As argued above, we can jus-
tify the viewpoint that the objective maximisation problem of the public firm is to
promote the social welfare, while that of the partial privatisation government is to
secure both the social welfare and its attainment of tax revenues.
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The paper that comes closest to the comparison of efficiency of ad valorem and
unit taxes in imperfectly competitive market is well written by Anderson et al.
(2001).2 The authors provide a simple proof that ad valorem taxes are welfare-
superior to unit taxes in the short run when production costs are identical across
firms.3 The proof covers differentiated products and a wide range of market prod-
uct. Cost asymmetries strengthen the case for ad valorem taxation under Cournot
competition, but unit taxation may be welfare-superior under Bertrand competi-
tion with product differentiation. Ad valorem taxation is superior with free entry
under Cournot competition, but not necessarily under price competition when
consumers value variety.
Blackorby and Murty (2007) shows that if a monopoly sector is imbedded in a
general equilibrium framework and profits are taxed at one hundred percent, then
unit (specific) taxation and ad valorem taxation are welfare-wise equivalent. Under
certain regularity conditions, for any fixed vector of profit shares, Blackorby and
Murty (2013) shows that the utility possibility sets of economies with unit and ad val-
orem taxes are not generally identical. But it does not imply that one completely
dominates the other. Rather, the two utility possibility frontiers cross each other.
Additionally, by employing a standard partial equilibrium welfare analysis, we show
that the Marshallian social surpluses resulting from the two tax structures are identi-
cal when the government can implement unrestricted transfers.
Aiura and Ogawa (2013) examine the choice of tax method between ad valorem
tax and unit tax within the framework of spatial tax competition with cross-border
shopping, and they show that the ad valorem tax method is a good strategy to com-
pete for mobile consumers and consider that this choice leads to inferior outcome.
The welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes over unit taxes in a single-market
Cournot oligopoly is well-known. Hennessy and Lapan (2011) extends the analysis to
multi-market oligopoly. Kotsogiannis and Serfes (2011) show that privatisation affects
both optimal subsidy rate and resulting welfare.
For more complicated situations, with respect to multiproduct transactions,
Hamilton (1999) shows that the ad valorem taxation is better than unit taxation
under standard conditions. Anderson et al. (2001) analyse that the working of the
two taxations is in oligopoly with differentiated products and price competition.
However, cost asymmetries will make unit taxation a better instrument when con-
sumers have preference for variety, have perfectly inelastic demand functions, and oli-
gopolistic firms engage in price competition.
One important contribution in our paper is to allow for partial privatisation.
Indeed, the common feature of most existing work on mixed oligopoly is to assume
that the public firms care only about welfare. However in many countries, public
firms are partially privatised, which implies they also care about profit. A natural way
to formalise this is to assume that the public firm maximises a (convex) combination
of welfare and profit, and to represent the extent of privatisation as the weight the
public firms put on profits.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We formulate a reasonable model in
section 2. Then we discuss effects of two tax policies on output and tax revenue in
terms of three different-type markets in sections 3 and 4. And we also make
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efficiency comparisons in terms of welfare implications for different markets in sec-
tion 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Basic model
Our mixed duopoly model contains a private firm and a public firm competing in
quantities (Cournot model), which means that each firm’s relevant strategic consider-
ation pays attention only to quantity instead of price. The two firms produce homo-
geneous goods. The private firm is called firm 1 and supplies the product at
quantity q1, and the public firm is called firm 2 and supplies the product at
quantity q2. They both produce in conditions of no fixed costs, and constant mar-
ginal and average costs, which are normalised to 0 for the private firm and to c> 0
for the public firm. The additional cost is a constant which reflects the idea that the
public firm is less efficient (possible causes will be discussed later).
We assume a linear inverse demand function P Qð Þ ¼ 1 Q, where Q ¼ q1 þ q2
and denotes the aggregate output and P is the price. On the demand side of the mar-
ket, the representative consumer’s utility is then a quadratic function given by：
U Qð Þ ¼ q1 þ q2  12 q1 þ q2ð Þ
2
Under a taxation system, there is a unit taxation rate of t t>0ð Þ per unit of output,
or an ad valorem taxation rate of s 0<s<1ð Þ fraction of gross revenue. Suppose both
the unit taxation and the ad valorem taxation are imposed on the producers. So, the
firms’ profits are given by the following formula under the imposition of unit tax-
ation:
pu1 ¼ Ptð Þq1; pu2 ¼ Pctð Þq2
and are given by the following formula under ad valorem taxation:
pa1 ¼ 1sð ÞPð Þq1; pa2 ¼ 1sð ÞPcð Þq2
The objective of the private firm is to maximise its profits. And without privatisation,
the public firm, in contrast, hopes to maximise social welfare (W), which is defined as
the sum of consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS) and tax revenue (R).
The public firm’s output is the solution of the following problem under a unit tax-
ation scheme:
Max
q2 Wuð Þ ¼Maxq2 CSþ PSu þ Ruð Þ
and is the solution of the following problem under an ad valorem taxation scheme:
Max
q2 Wað Þ ¼Maxq2 CSþ PSa þ Rað Þ
where Ru is unit tax revenue and Ra is ad valorem tax revenue.
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Furthermore, if there is privatisation, a natural way to formalise this is to assume
that the public firm maximises a convex combination of welfare and profit. So now
the privatised firm’s output is the solution of the following problem under unit tax-
ation policy:
Max
q2 Uuð Þ ¼ Maxq2 aWu þ 1að Þpu2
 
and is the solution of the following problem under ad valorem taxation policy:
Max
q2 Uað Þ ¼ Maxq2 aWa þ 1að Þpa2
 
where 0  a  1 is the weight of the payoff of the government for the firm’s object-
ive. All possible values of a are as follows:
1. If a¼ 0, it corresponds to full privatisation (profit maximisation);
2. If a¼ 1, it corresponds to full nationalisation (welfare maximisation) which is the
same with the public firm 2;
3. If 0< a< 1, the firm is partially privatised.
The parameter a captures the degree of privatisation. Partial privatisation is
defined as 0< a< 1 (pointed out by Matsumura (1998)). Moreover, we assume that
the government can indirectly control a through its share-holding. If the shares
owned by the government increase, then a increases.
3. Effects of unit and ad valorem taxation on output and tax revenue
without privatisation
In this section we compare unit and ad valorem taxation in terms of output and tax
revenue under the model we have built in Section 2. Since we consider the long-run
equilibrium, the analysis allows for the firms’ choices to depend on the tax policy.
And we consider the situation with no privatisation in this section. We first derive
expressions for the consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS), and tax revenue
(R). They can be written as:
1. CS ¼ Ð q1þq20 P xð Þdx  P q1 þ q2ð Þ ¼ U Qð Þ  P q1 þ q2ð Þ where
U Qð Þ ¼ q1 þ q2  12 q1 þ q2ð Þ2, P ¼ 1q1q2, so CS ¼ q1 þ q2  12 q1 þ q2ð Þ2  P
q1 þ q2ð Þ
2. PSu ¼ pu1 þ pu2 þ FC ¼ pu1 þ pu2, PSa ¼ pa1 þ pa2 þ FC ¼ pa1 þ pa2
3. Ru ¼ t q1 þ q2ð Þ, Ra ¼ sP q1 þ q2ð Þ
4. W ¼ CSþ PSþ R
3.1. Effects of taxations on output
In this section, we present clear proof to show that both of the two tax policies do
not alter the equilibrium total output, however, they will affect the firms’ equilib-
rium outputs.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 477
3.1.1. Unit taxation analysis
In this section we examine how unit taxation affects the equilibrium total output.
Proposition 1. In a Cournot mixed-duopoly market with homogeneous goods, if there
does not exist privatisation, the imposition of unit taxation does not affect equilibrium
total output and market price, but an increase in the unit taxation will always reduce
the output of the private firm and increase the output of the public firm, which means
that with an increase in taxation the less efficient (public) firm gains market share over
the more efficient (private) firm.
Proof. Because the two firms both produce positive quantity outputs in Cournot
Model, firm 1 chooses q1 and firm 2 chooses q2, so we can find the two firms’ profits
under unit tax policy are:
pu1 ¼ Ptð Þq1; pu2 ¼ Pctð Þq2:
With the imposition of unit taxation, the private firm’s output is the solution of
the following problem:
Max
q1 ðpu1Þ ¼ Maxq1 ððPtÞq1Þ
The public firm’s output is the solution of the following problem:
Max
q2 Wuð Þ ¼ Maxq2 CSþ PSu þ Ruð Þ ¼ Maxq2 q1 þ q2 
1
2
q1 þ q2ð Þ2  cq2
 
In order to make sense of these two equations, it shall be noted that the optimum
will require the output levels to solve the following first-order conditions:
@pu1
@q1
¼ 1 2q1  q2  t ¼ 0 (1)
@Wu
@q2
¼ 1 q1 þ q2ð Þ  c ¼ 0 (2)
The equation (2) means that Q ¼ q1 þ q2 ¼ 1 c is a constant (we have assumed that
the additional cost c is constant). So the imposition of the unit taxation does not affect the
reaction function. It is straightforward that the total output Q remains unchanged no mat-
ter whether the imposition of the unit taxation is increasing or decreasing.
Thus, by combining the equations (1) and (2), we can get the following unique
Nash Equilibrium output levels:
qu1 ¼ c t (3)
qu2 ¼ 1 2cþ t (4)
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So an increase in unit taxation will always decrease the equilibrium output of the
more efficient private firm 1 (qu1 ). And in equilibrium, the less efficient firm 2 pro-
duces more with the more imposition of unit tax. A parallel proof establishes the
claim for the ad valorem case.
3.1.2. Ad valorem taxation analysis
The ad valorem taxation analysis is similar to the unit taxation analysis. Utilising the
same process of calculation as in the previous case, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. In a Cournot mixed duopoly with homogeneous goods and if there is
not privatisation, the imposition of ad valorem taxation also does not change total out-
put and market price, and the equilibrium outputs of the private firm and the public
firm also remain unchanged.
Proof. Firm 1 chooses q1 and firm 2 chooses q2, so we can derive the following
profit functions for two firms:
pa1 ¼ 1sð ÞPq1; pa2 ¼ 1sð ÞPcð Þq2
With the imposition of ad valorem taxation, the private firm’s output is the solu-





  ¼Maxq1 1sð ÞPq1
 
The public firm’s output is the solution of the following problem:
Max
q2 Wað Þ ¼Maxq2 CSþ PSa þ Rað Þ ¼Maxq2 q1 þ q2 
1
2
q1 þ q2ð Þ2  cq2
 
The proof is similar to that in Subsection 3.1.1, and under an ad valorem tax, the
first order conditions for profit maximisation are:
@pa1
@q1
¼ 1sð Þ 12q1q2ð Þ ¼ 0 (5)
@Wa
@q2
¼ 1 q1 þ q2ð Þ  c ¼ 0 (6)
Equation (6) means that Q ¼ q1 þ q2 ¼ 1 c is a constant. So the imposition of
the ad valorem taxation also does not alter the reaction function. It is straightforward
that the total output Q is unchanged no matter whether the imposition of the ad val-
orem taxation is increasing or decreasing.
Solving the above first-order conditions of equations (5) and (6), we obtain the fol-
lowing unique Nash Equilibrium quantities:
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qa1 ¼ c (7)
qa2 ¼ 1 2c (8)
So the imposition of the ad valorem taxation will not affect the equilibrium out-
puts of the private firm 1 (qa1 ) and the public firm 2 (q
a
2 ).
Above all, the proposition 2 is proved. Both proposition 1 and 2 have summarised
the effects of two taxation policies on output with no privatisation market.
3.2. Effects of taxations on tax revenue
The next proposition provides sufficient conditions to show that both taxation poli-
cies have positive effects on tax revenue.
Proposition 3. In the mixed duopoly market with homogeneous goods, and if there
does not exist privatisation, an increase in taxation (either unit or ad valorem) can
always increase the tax revenue.
Proof. We can also derive the expression of unit tax revenue from equations (7) and
(8):
Ru ¼ t qu1 þ qu2
  ¼ t 1cð Þ (9)
where t > 0.
Differentiating Ruwith respect to t and making use of equation (9), we find that:
@Ru
@t
¼ 1 c > 0:
This result shows that Ru is always increasing in t, which implies that the impos-
ition of unit taxation will always increase tax revenue.
Similarly, we can also derive the expression of ad valorem tax revenue:
Ra ¼ sP qa1 þ qa2
  ¼ sc 1cð Þ (10)
From the expression of this tax revenue, we can calculate that
@Ra
@s
¼ c 1cð Þ > 0:
So Ra is also increasing in s; it means that the imposition of the ad valorem tax-
ation also will always increase the tax revenue. So, an increase in either unit taxation
or ad valorem taxation always increases tax revenue.
Thus, Proposition 3 is proved.
It is interesting to observe that in a corresponding quantity setting Cournot oligop-
oly model instead of mixed-duopoly model, an increase in ad valorem taxation will
always decrease the total output and increase the market share of a more efficient
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firm. In contrast, in our mixed-duopoly model, total output will not be altered but
the market share of the less efficient public firm rises if there is no privatisation.
Moreover, the tax increase (either unit or ad valorem tax) always raises total tax rev-
enue in our mixed-duopoly market. In contrast, in a Cournot oligopoly model it may
fall if the initial taxation level is sufficiently high.
In the next section, we will compare same thing but consider privatisation in
the market.
4. Effects of unit and ad valorem taxation on output and tax revenue
with privatisation
In this section, we consider a much more complicated and practical problem—we
allow privatisation to be involved in the market. According to all possible values of a,
we will discuss two situations: full privatisation when a¼ 0, and partial privatisation
when 0< a <1. And either market type will lower the equilibrium total output under
the Cournot Model. In addition, efficiency for tax revenue, which is more compli-
cated, is also examined. The following proposition shows our results.
Proposition 4. In the Cournot mixed-duopoly market with homogeneous goods,
i. Full privatisation (a¼ 0) leads to a decrease in equilibrium total output with the
imposition of either unit taxation or ad valorem taxation. Tax revenue will
increase if the tax is fixed by an ad valorem tax rate, but it is indeterminate if the
tax is fixed by a unit tax rate.
ii. Partial privatisation (0< a< 1) also leads to a decreasing equilibrium total output
whether the tax is fixed by unit tax rate or by ad valorem tax rate. Tax revenue
will increase if the tax is fixed by an ad valorem tax rate, but it is indeterminate if
the tax is fixed by a unit tax rate.
Proof. Based on the assumption, we know that the privatised firm’s output is the
solution of the following problem under the imposition of unit taxation:
Max
q2 Uuð Þ ¼Maxq2 aWu þ 1að Þpu2
 
with ad valorem taxation policy, the objective function is given by:
Max
q2 Uað Þ ¼Maxq2 aWa þ 1að Þpa2
 
From the assumption we know that 0  a  1 is the weight of the payoff of the
government for the firm’s objection.
1. If a¼ 0, it corresponds to full privatisation (profit maximisation).
2. If a¼ 1, it corresponds to full nationalisation (welfare maximisation) which is the
same total as with the public firm 2.
3. If 0< a< 1, it means that the firm is partial privatised.
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Since we have discussed situations of a¼ 1 (full nationalisation) in previous sec-
tions, so we can just discuss the two situations of a¼ 0 and 0< a < 1 in this section.
4.1. Full privatisation (a5 0)
Now the market changes to a privatised-duopoly market instead of mixed-duopoly.
But in order to compare without loss of generality, we still have to consider
this market.
4.1.1. Unit taxation analysis





  ¼Maxq1 Ptð Þq1
 
The fully privatised firm’s output is the solution of the following problem under





  ¼ Maxq2 Pctð Þq2
 
Then we can find the Cournot Equilibrium from the first order conditions. And
we assume that all firms produce a positive quantity outputs in the Cournot Model,
so solving for an interior solution and denoting the equilibrium output levels by qu1









While the corresponding equilibrium total output and market price are:








Straightforward computation yields that an increase in the unit tax rate will always
decrease qu1 , q
u
2 and Q




Based on these equilibrium outputs, we can also derive the expression of unit tax
revenue from equations (11) and (12):
Ru ¼ t qu1 þ qu2
  ¼ t 2c2t
3
(15)
where t > 0 and c is constant.
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From equations (11) and (12) we can derive that @Ru@t ¼  4tþc23 >  2t3
(for 2 c > 2t), which can be positive, zero, or negative. So Ru’s relationship with t
is indeterminate.
4.1.2. Ad valorem taxation analysis





  ¼Maxq1 1sð ÞPq1
 
The fully privatised firm’s output is the solution of the following problem under





  ¼Maxq2 1sð ÞP  cð Þq2
 
Then we can find the Cournot Equilibrium from the first order conditions. And
we assume that all firms produce a positive quantity output in Cournot Model, so
solving for an interior solution and denoting the equilibrium output levels by qa1 and
qa2 , then we can obtain
qa1 ¼
1sþ c
3 1sð Þ (16)
qa2 ¼
1s2c
3 1sð Þ (17)
Then we can calculate the equilibrium total output and market price:
Qa ¼ qa1 þ qa2 ¼
22sc
3 1sð Þ (18)
Pa ¼ 1 qa1  qa2 ¼
cþ 1s
3 1sð Þ (19)
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So we conclude that an imposition of the increase in the ad valorem taxation will




We can also derive the expression of ad valorem tax revenue from equations (18)
and (19):
Ra ¼ sPa qa1 þ qa2
  ¼ 1
9
s 22scð Þ 1sþ cð Þ
s1ð Þ2
(20)




3 þ 6s2sc2sc6sc2 þ cþ 2
9 1sð Þ3
¼ 1sð Þ cþ 2 1sð Þ
2
 
 sþ 1ð Þc2
9 1sð Þ3
>




¼ 4c 1sð Þ
2 þ c2 1sð Þ
9 1sð Þ3
> 0
so Ra is increasing in s, it means that the imposition of ad valorem taxation will
always increase the tax revenue.
4.2. Partial privatisation (0< a < 1)
4.2.1. Unit taxation analysis





  ¼ Maxq1 Ptð Þq1
 
The privatised firm’s output is the solution of the following problem under the
imposition of unit taxation:
Max
q2 Uuð Þ ¼ Maxq2 aWu þ 1að Þpu2
 
Now we can derive the expression of Uu:
Uu ¼ aWu þ 1að Þpu2 ¼ a q1 þ q2
1
2
q1 þ q2ð Þ2cq2
 
þ 1að Þ Pctð Þq2
The first-order conditions for profit maximisation are:
@pu1
@q1
¼ 1 2q1  q2  t ¼ 0
@Uu
@q2
¼ 1 q1 þ a2ð Þq2  cþ a1ð Þt ¼ 0
so the Nash equilibrium output levels are given by:







Qu ¼ qu1 þ qu2 ¼
2ata2tcþ 2
3 2a (23)
Since 0< a < 1, so (3—2a)>0 and @q
u
1
@t ¼ 132a < 0 which means that the equilib-
rium output of the private firm is decreasing in t.
According the range of a, we know that @q
u
2
@t ¼ 2a132a can be negative, positive or
zero. It means that the sign of @q
u
2
@t is not determinate.
We can derive @Q
u
@t ¼ 2a232a < 0, which means that the equilibrium total output is
decreasing in t.
We can also derive the expression of unit tax revenue from equations (21) and
(22):
Ru ¼ t qu1 þ qu2
  ¼ t 2ata2tcþ 2
3 2a (24)
where t > 0 and c is constant.
Straightforward calculation implies that (according to equations (21) and







and 2a2ð Þt  2t; 0ð Þ. So the sign of @Ru@t is not determinate, which means that the
effect of unit taxation on tax revenue is indeterminate (increasing, unchanged or
decreasing are both possible).
4.2.2. Ad valorem taxation analysis





  ¼ Maxq1 1sð ÞPq1
 
The partially privatised firm’s objective maximisation function is:
Max
q2 Uað Þ ¼ Maxq2 aWa þ 1að Þpa2
 
Now we can derive the expression of Ua:
Ua ¼ aWa þ 1 að Þpa2
¼ a q1 þ q2  12 q1 þ q2ð Þ
2  cq2
 
þ 1 að Þ 1 sð ÞP  cð Þq2
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The first-order conditions for profit maximisation are:
@pa1
@q1
¼ 1sð Þ 12q1q2ð Þ ¼ 0
@Ua
@q2
¼ s aþ q1 þ 2q2aq12aq21ð Þ þ aq2  q1  2q2 þ 1 ¼ 0
Solving these Nash equilibrium conditions, the output levels are:
qa1 ¼
asaþ csþ 1
aþ 3 1að Þ 1sð Þ (25)
qa2 ¼
as2csþ 1
aþ 3 1að Þ 1sð Þ (26)
Qa ¼ qa1 þ qa2 ¼
2asac2sþ 2
aþ 3 1að Þ 1sð Þ (27)
From equations (25) to (27) we can show that
@qa1
@s
¼ 1að Þ 3cað Þ
3as2a3sþ 3ð Þ2 > 0
@qa2
@s
¼ 2 1að Þ 3cað Þ
3as2a3sþ 3ð Þ2 < 0
@Qa
@s
¼  1að Þ 3cað Þ
3as2a3sþ 3ð Þ2 < 0
so qa1 is increasing in s, but q
a
2 and Q
a are both decreasing in s (the inequality
3c a > 0 ensures that two taxation aren’t negative).
According to equations (25) to (27), we can conclude that 1Qa ¼ qa1
and 1 2qa1 ¼ qa2 , so we can also derive the expression of ad valorem tax revenue:
Ra ¼ sQa 1Qað Þ ¼ s 2asac2sþ 2ð Þ asaþ csþ 1ð Þ























so tax revenue is increasing in the ad valorem tax.
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4.3. Comparisons of indirect taxation and market type
In this section, if the type of taxation is fixed and the assumption holds, then we
show in the following Table 1 a comparison of the effects of taxes in terms of equilib-
rium output, tax revenue, and total surplus in different models by combining results
given from previous sections. This table shows the most obvious explanations
and results.
5. Efficiency comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation
This section considers the relative efficiency of unit taxation and ad valorem taxation
in terms of welfare implications in different imperfectly competitive markets. The
most important observation here is to suppose these two taxations can produce the
same total output in equilibrium, which is also used by Anderson et al. (2001). Then
we can show that ad valorem taxation is always welfare superior to unit taxation
under full privatisation market (a¼ 0), full nationalisation market (a¼ 1), and the
partial privatisation market (0< a < 1). The following propositions extend the effi-
ciency result in Proposition 1 to 4 for Cournot in the long run. The following proofs
also depict these results.
Proposition 5. For full nationalisation (a¼ 1), it always can produce equal equilib-
rium total output in the two different taxation schemes. Assuming that these two differ-
ent taxation returns are equal under Cournot competition with homogeneous goods in
a mixed duopoly market, then we can get proof that ad valorem taxation is welfare
superior to unit taxation.
Proof. From the assumption that these two different taxation returns are equal, we
can derive that t ¼ sc.
Now, under two taxation schemes, we have Wa Wu ¼ c2s > 0, which implies
that ad valorem taxation is welfare superior.
Proposition 6. Considering Cournot competition with homogeneous goods in a mixed
duopoly market, and assuming that these two different taxation schemes are selected
such that they can produce equal equilibrium total output, so we can get
Table 1. Tax efficiency comparison on equilibrium output and tax revenue.
Full nationalisation in Cournot
mixed-duopoly (a¼ 1)
Full privatisation in Cournot
privatised-duopoly (a¼ 0)
Partial privatisation in












Total output Unchanged Unchanged Decreasing Decreasing Decreasing Decreasing
Equilibrium output
of a private firm
Decreasing Unchanged Decreasing Increasing Indeterminate Increasing
Equilibrium output
of a public firm
Increasing Unchanged Decreasing Decreasing Decreasing Decreasing
Tax revenue Increasing Increasing Indeterminate Increasing Indeterminate Increasing
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that t ¼ cs2 1sð Þ. Under this condition, the ad valorem taxation is welfare superior to the
unit taxation for full privatisation (a¼ 0).
Proof. When the condition t ¼ cs2 1sð Þ is met, we can get equal equilibrium total out-
put for this market type under the two different tax schemes. Firstly, we compare
tax revenue.
For full privatisation (a¼ 0), given t ¼ cs2 1sð Þ we get that:




The tax revenue difference is: Ra  Ru ¼ s 22scð Þ
2
18 1sð Þ2 which is strictly positive.
Next, we calculate the social welfare differences under two kinds of tax. According
to the previous results, we can get that Wa Wu ¼ sc22 1sð Þ > 0. So we can conclude
that the ad valorem is also welfare superior in this situation.
Proposition 7. Considering Cournot competition with homogeneous goods in a mixed
duopoly market, and assuming that these two different taxation schemes are selected




3as 2a 3sþ 3 :
Under this condition, the ad valorem taxation is welfare superior to the unit tax-
ation for the partial privatisation (0< a < 1). (The implied condition here is a < 3c,
otherwise we will have a negative unit taxation)
Proof. For partial privatisation (0< a < 1), we derive that:
Qu ¼ Qa ¼ 2asþ ac1a2sc1c2 þ 2
3as 2a 3sþ 3
The tax revenue difference is:
Ra  Ru ¼ s 2asa2scþ 2ð Þ
2
2 3as2a3sþ 3ð Þ2 > 0;
which indicate that the ad valorem taxation return is still higher .
At this time, the difference of social welfare is
Wa Wu ¼ sc 3ca
ð Þ
2 3as2a3sþ 3ð Þ :
The denominator is always positive, while 3cað Þ generates a positive sign in the
numerator, so Wa Wu > 0, which indicates that the ad valorem is also welfare
superior in this situation.
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From the proofs of Propositions 5 to 7, we can conclude that ad valorem taxation
is always welfare superior to unit taxation under full nationalisation, full privatisation,
and the partial privatisation markets.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm
and a public firm with homogeneous goods and with different values of the weight of
the payoff of the government for the firm’s objective. The analysis of the effects of
unit taxation and ad valorem taxation in a mixed oligopoly (full nationalisation or
partially privatised) yields some significantly different results in comparison to those
conclusions obtained in a corresponding Cournot oligopoly.
Firstly, in full nationalisation in a Cournot mixed-duopoly (a¼ 1): total output is
unaffected by the imposition of or change in either taxation. However, with an
increase in unit taxation, the less efficient (public) firm gains market share over the
more efficient (private) firm. But in the case of ad valorem, the market share of pri-
vate firm and public firm will remain unchanged. In addition, tax revenue always
rises with a tax increase in either taxation. Either full privatisation (a¼ 0) or partial
privatisation (0< a < 1) in a Cournot privatised-duopoly will reduce the equilibrium
total output when either tax is levied.
In addition, by introducing taxes in a mixed duopoly model we show that privat-
isation lowers total output and equilibrium output of less efficient firms for either a
fixed level of unit tax or a fixed ad valorem tax level. And the effect of both types of
privatisation on tax revenue are indeterminate with a levy of unit taxation. But pri-
vatisation can increase the tax revenue with the imposition of ad valorem taxation.
Moreover, we use a straightforward approach that provides a clean proof of the
unit and ad valorem efficiency claim. And we extend this result to the market involv-
ing privatisation. We examine that ad valorem taxation is always welfare superior to
unit taxation for a full privatisation market (a¼ 0), a full nationalisation market
(a¼ 1) and the partial privatisation market (0< a < 1) in our paper.
One important contribution of our paper is to allow for partial privatisation. Our
research has certain practical value. The central and western regions in China are
relatively concentrated areas of crude oil, natural gas, and other resources, and yet
are underdeveloped. A tax practice of resource tax in the form ad valorem duty com-
bined with partial privatisation will, in our view, not only protect resources and pre-
vent excessive development, but also can increase local fiscal revenue, enhance the
level of social welfare and ensure the regional coordination and sustainable
development.
On the side, the framework in this paper can be readily adapted to incorporate
other effects of economic interest, such as differences across firms with the objective
of producing differentiated goods. Anderson et al. (1992) have extended the differen-
tiated products model to consider multiproduct firms, and tax issues may be
addressed within that extended context. Our model can be extended to international
trade to study other economic problems such as optimal tariffs, and the partial equi-
librium setting will ideally be extended to the case of general equilibrium in order to
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study the taxation of goods in conjunction with the taxation of income and capital.
Furthermore, we do not allow the Bertrand-Equilibria in which the results may have
better comparison. Thus, extending our model to these directions remains for
future research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. For recent researches on mixed oligopoly, see, for example, Nie (2014) and Tao
et al. (2013).
2. Mujumdar and Pal (1998) show that ad valorem and specific taxes in a mixed oligopoly
yield some significantly different results in comparison to those obtained in a
corresponding Cournot oligopoly. Other papers comparing ad valorem and unit taxes
include Aiura and Ogawa (2013), Hennessy and Lapan (2011), and Kotsogiannis and
Serfes (2011).
3. By studying a differentiated goods oligopoly with asymmetric costs, Wang and Zhao
(2009) show that unit taxation can be welfare superior to ad valorem taxation if the
goods are sufficiently differentiated, the cost variance is sufficiently large, and the ad
valorem tax rate is sufficiently high. Hsu and Wang (2011) note that, in a homogenous
good oligopoly, if firms have different costs then the least efficient firms are more likely
to be inactive under ad valorem taxation than under unit taxation, making it possible for
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